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Abstract
How does a higher inflation target affect determinacy and learnability of rational expec-
tations equilibria under alternative monetary/fiscal policy mixes in New Keynesian models?
What is the role of central bank transparency? This paper proves that, in a non-Ricardian
regime, determinacy and learnability conditions are insensitive to changes in trend inflation
and to transparency issues: expectation stabilization requires taxes to react weakly to gov-
ernment debt. Conversely, a higher inflation target always destabilizes expectations under
active monetary regimes. In a Ricardian regime, raising the inflation target requires a more
hawkish central bank to attain determinacy. However, determinacy implies learnability only
when agents are aware of both the inflation target and the central bank reaction function.
If agents need to learn a positive inflation target, active monetary regimes are unstable.
Therefore, fully disclosing the reaction function, including the target inflation rate, greatly
increases the central bank’s effectiveness in stabilizing expectations.
JEL classification: E52, E62.
1 Introduction
The bulk of the recent theoretical literature on monetary policy considers models where govern-
ments are ready to passively change taxes to cover public debt. Assuming an always satisfied
government budget constraint is equivalent to leaving fiscal policy in the background. The Great
Recession, with the joint stimulus of aggregate demand by both monetary and fiscal policies and
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the coordination problems among the two, has renewed attention on the ‘fiscal theory of the
price level’, initiated by Sargent and Wallace (1981), Sims (1994), Leeper (1991), and Woodford
(1996). This literature brings fiscal policy on the foreground together with monetary policy since
it finds that the determination of the price level cannot abstract from their interactions.1 In
particular, the price level can be pinned down under rational expectations only in two different
cases. In the first, the central bank implements a policy that complies with the Taylor principle
while the government simply limits itself to satisfy its budget constraint - this situation has
been dubbed as the active-monetary/passive-fiscal (AM/PF) case by Leeper (1991) or as the
Ricardian case by Woodford (1996). In the second case, the government independently decides
the level of the budget surplus (or deficit) while the central bank is required to adjust mone-
tary policy in order to satisfy the government budget constraint through price level changes -
the so-called passive-monetary/active-fiscal (PM/AF) or non-Ricardian case. The most recent
literature on the argument (see, e.g., Bianchi, 2012; Davig and Leeper, 2011) employs Markov
switching models to account for regime shifts in policy rules that take place through the years
in a given country: next to the conventional case where an active monetary rule is associated to
a passive rule, estimates document periods of passive monetary and active fiscal rules but even
of double active or double passive policies.
This paper examines how the equilibrium properties of a New Keynesian model with monetary-
fiscal interactions are modified when trend inflation is accounted for. Studying whether and how
a variation in the inflation target affects the equilibrium properties of the model is particularly
important in light of the recent proposals (Rogoff, 2008; Blanchard et al., 2010; Ball, 2013) to
increase the inflation target in order to exit from the zero lower bound region where monetary
policy is ineffective. What are the effects of a higher inflation target on the determinacy proper-
ties under alternative monetary/fiscal policy mixes in New Keynesian models? Would it be more
difficult for the central bank to still retain a tight grasp of inflation expectations once the infla-
tion target is raised? What role for central bank transparency? To provide an answer to these
questions we study, beyond equilibria determinacy, even expectational stability (E-stability). In
order to do so, we need to drop the assumption of rational expectation and let private agents
form their forecasts according to a recursive learning rule a` la Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
The analysis is undertaken assuming both an opaque central bank that does not communicate
1For a review of the existing literature on this issue see Canzoneri et al. (2011).
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its policy to private agents and a transparent one, in light of the work of Eusepi and Preston
(2010). Unlike the most recent literature, we do not explicitly model regime changes but, rather,
we set a best-case scenario with a fixed-coefficient environment: if agents result unable to learn
under this static context they, a fortiori, will find it more difficult to learn with policy regime
shifts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After having devoted the next subsection to
highlight similarities and differences from related literature, Section 2 presents the model and
the methodology. Section 3 contains the determinacy results under zero (3.1) and positive trend
inflation (3.2), the learning analysis (3.3) and the impulse response functions derived from the
model (3.4). Section 4 provides some robustness checks and Section 5 concludes.
1.1 Related literature
This paper may be considered as an extension of Ascari and Florio (2012) to a setting with
an explicit role for fiscal policy.2 Beside studying determinacy and learning under opacity and
transparency in a New Keynesian model with trend inflation, we also provide an analysis of the
impulse response function of the model. This should be of interest from a double perspective.
First, it shows if and how the transmission mechanism of economic shocks changes when alter-
native policy mixes are in place. Second, it reveals how high levels of trend inflation affect the
results.
In order to better organize the exposition, we divide the related literature distinguishing
among papers that deal, respectively, with determinacy, learning and impulse response analyses
under monetary-fiscal interactions.
1.1.1 Determinacy
The pivotal paper studying determinacy under both active and passive monetary and fiscal rules
is Leeper (1991). The author, employing a flexible price model with contemporaneous policy
rules and lump-sum taxes, shows that there is a unique stable equilibrium (determinacy) only if
the fiscal and monetary authorities coordinate their policies (AM/PF or PM/AF). On the other
hand, a lack of coordination returns multiple equilibria (indeterminacy) in case of a double
2In this section we will just report the literature dealing with monetary-fiscal interactions. We refer the
interested reader to Ascari and Florio (2012) for a more general review of the literature on learning and trend
inflation.
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passive mix or lack of equilibrium (explosiveness) with a double active mix. Branch et al. (2008)
extend the paper by Leeper (1991) to include determinacy analysis for different monetary policy
rules under the same (flexible price) model. A work closer to ours is instead represented by
Rossi (2009), who studies the equilibrium determinacy of a New Keynesian model with trend
inflation and public debt. However, Rossi does not account for non-rational expectations and
employs distortionary taxation, while our study deals with learning and maintains Leeper’s
(1991) assumption of lump-sum taxes.
1.1.2 Learning
Evans and Honkapohja (2007) study the learning properties of Leeper’s (1991) flexible price
model by finding that determinate equilibria are also E-stable. Our analysis, as for learning
is concerned, is an extension of theirs along three dimensions: we consider a model with price
rigidity, we include trend inflation and we look at expectational stability under both monetary
policy transparency and opacity. Apart from the inclusion of trend inflation, our model is close
to Eusepi and Preston (2012) who study learning dynamics under uncertainty about monetary
and fiscal conditions and find that, in this case, stabilization policies are more difficult than
under rational expectations. To enlarge the set of policies consistent with E-stability, the expec-
tations about monetary and fiscal policies should be anchored through transparency. Our paper
abstracts from transparency considerations on fiscal policy though we consider it a fruitful point
for future research.
Kobayashi and Muto (2013) and Kurozumi (2014) study determinacy and expectational
stability of a New Keynesian model under trend inflation. Compared to these papers we offer
two main contributions: (i) monetary/fiscal interactions and (ii) the effects of central bank’s
transparency on the anchoring of expectations. A further difference is the assumption about the
learning process, namely the dating of expectations.3
1.1.3 Impulse response analysis
Following Kim (2003), Canzoneri et al. (2011) use impulse response functions to show the differ-
ent effects of policy innovations according to the monetary/fiscal regime in place in a cash and
3See Section 3.3.2 and the robustness checks in Section 3.5 for the implications of their dating of expectations
on the results.
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credit goods model.4 While in the Ricardian case shocks have the conventional effects, in the
non-Ricardian case the presence of wealth effects modifies the impulse responses. By introducing
trend inflation we can show that the impulse responses of our model change not only depending
on the policy mix but also on the level of the inflation target.
2 Model and methodology
2.1 The Model
The model we use is based on Ascari and Ropele (2009), that extends the basic New Keynesian
(NK) framework (e.g., Woodford, 2003; Gal´ı, 2008) to allow for positive trend inflation. Fiscal
policy is added following Bhattarai et al. (2014) by introducing a simple backward looking fiscal
rule with lump-sum taxes and one-period government bonds. Details on the model are left in
the online appendix. Log-linearizing the model around a generic positive inflation steady state
yields the following equations:
yˆt = E
∗
t−1yˆt+1 − E∗t−1
(
Rˆt − pˆit+1
)
, (1)
pˆit = βp¯iE
∗
t−1pˆit+1 + λp¯iE
∗
t−1 [(1 + σn) yˆt + σnsˆt] + ηp¯iE
∗
t−1
[
(θ − 1) pˆit+1 + φˆt+1
]
, (2)
φˆt = αβp¯i
(θ−1)E∗t−1
[
(θ − 1) pˆit+1 + φˆt+1
]
, (3)
sˆt = ξp¯ipˆit + αp¯i
θsˆt−1, (4)
Rˆt = φpiE
∗
t−1pˆit + εm,t, (5)
τˆt = γbˆt−1 + ετ,t, (6)
bˆt = β
−1bˆt−1 + b¯β−1(Rˆt−1 − pˆit)− τˆt. (7)
Hatted variables denote percentage deviations from steady state,5 apart from yˆ, which is the
usual New Keynesian output gap defined as deviation from the flexible price output level. The
structural parameters and their convolutions (λp¯i, ηp¯i and ξp¯i) are described in Table 1. εm,t and
ετ,t are the monetary and fiscal policy shocks that follow the autoregressive processes εm,t =
ρmεm,t−1+um,t and ετ,t = ρτετ,t−1+uτ,t, where um,t and uτ,t are i.i.d. noises and 0 < ρm, ρτ < 1.
Equation (1) is the standard Euler equation for consumption. Equations (2) and (3) describe
4Kim (2003) employs a money-in-utility model.
5We use the definitions bˆt =
bt−b∗
y∗ and τˆt =
τt−τ∗
y∗ , where we indicate the steady state values with a star.
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the evolution of the inflation rate in presence of trend inflation. φˆt is just an auxiliary variable
(equal to the present discounted value of future expected marginal revenue) that allows writing
the model in recursive way. Equation (4) describes the evolution of price dispersion, sˆt. In
contrast to the zero inflation steady state case, under positive trend inflation price dispersion af-
fects inflation dynamics even at first-order approximation and thus has to be taken into account.
Equations (2)-(4) are the counterparts of the New Keynesian Phillips curve for the standard zero
inflation steady state case. Equation (5) is the simplest standard contemporaneous Taylor rule.
Equation (6) is the fiscal policy rule that sets taxes according to outstanding real debt, while eq.
(7) is the flow budget constraint of the government (where b¯ is the steady state debt-over-GDP
ratio). By plugging the fiscal rule into the budget constraint we obtain
bˆt = (β
−1 − γ)bˆt−1 + b¯β−1(Rˆt−1 − pˆit)− ετ,t.
Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and much of the related literature on learning, we
deviate from Ascari and Ropele (2009) and assume that agents have non-rational expectations,
that we denote with E∗. Furthermore, we assume that expectations are formed using the
information set available at period t − 1 (as in Bullard and Mitra, 2002). According to Evans
and Honkapohja (2001), this assumption is more natural in a learning context, since it avoids
simultaneity between expectations and current values of endogenous variables.
Table 1. Parameters description and benchmark calibration
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Intertemporal discount factor
σn 1.00 Inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labour supply
θ 11.00 Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of substitution
α 0.75 Calvo probability not to optimize prices
p¯i Central bank inflation target (or trend inflation)
φpi Inflation parameter in the Taylor rule
γ Fiscal rule parameter
b¯ 0.40 Debt/GDP
ρm 0.90 Monetary shock persistence
ρτ 0.90 Fiscal shock persistence
NKPC coefficients definition
λp¯i
(
1− αp¯iθ−1) (1− αβp¯iθ) (αpiθ−1)−1
ηp¯i β (p¯i − 1)
(
1− αp¯iθ−1)
ξp¯i θαp¯i
θ−1 (p¯i − 1)(1− αp¯iθ−1)−1
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2.2 Methodology
We are interested in analysing both determinacy and learnability conditions. As for determi-
nacy, we refer the reader to Sections 3.1 and 3.2 where we discuss the determinacy conditions,
respectively, under a zero inflation target and under positive trend inflation (for the case with
indivisible labour and no price indexation σn = ε = 0). In case of positive trend inflation, we
provide additional numerical simulations to investigate the relevance of our analytical results.
Section 3.3 deals, instead, with numerical simulations under learning.
2.2.1 Learnability
When agents do not possess rational expectations, the existence of a determinate equilibrium
does not ensure that agents coordinate upon it. As in the seminal contribution of Evans and
Honkapohja (2001), we assume that agents do not know the true structure of the economy.
Rather, they behave as econometricians and learn adaptively, using a recursive least square
algorithm based on the data produced by the economy itself. If the rational expectation equi-
librium is learnable, the learning dynamics will tend toward, and eventually coincide with, the
rational expectations equilibrium. Learnability is then an obviously desirable feature of mone-
tary policy.
We apply E-stability results outlined in Evans and Honkapohja (2001, section 10.2.1). Agents
are assumed to have identical beliefs and to forecast using variables that appear in the minimal
state variable (MSV) solution of the system under rational expectations. The form of agents’
perceived law of motion (PLM) coincides with the system MSV solution, up to a constant. As
our model is written in deviations from the steady state, the MSV solution does not include
a constant term. If we assume that agents know the inflation target set by the central bank,
the PLM does not contain a constant, either. Conversely, when agents are required to learn
the inflation target the PLM will be augmented with a constant. We consider both cases in
the following discussion. Agents are assumed to know just the autocorrelation of the shocks
but they have to estimate the remaining parameters. Each period, as additional data become
available, they re-estimate the coefficients of their model. We then ask whether agents are able
to learn the MSV equilibrium of the system (see the online appendix for details).
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2.2.2 Transparency versus opacity
In defining opacity (OP) and transparency (TR) of monetary policy, we follow closely the work
of Preston (2005) and Eusepi and Preston (2010). We assume that the central bank is perfectly
credible: the public believes and fully incorporates central bank’s announcements. Agents are
uncertain about the economy (pˆi, yˆ and bˆ) and about the path of nominal interest rates (Rˆ).
Communication by the central bank simplifies the agents’ problem in that it gives them in-
formation on how the monetary authority sets interest rates, that is, on the monetary policy
strategy. Therefore, under OP the private sector has to learn about the economy and about
monetary policy; under TR, private agents need to forecast just the economy but not the path
of nominal interest rates, since the central bank announces its reaction function. In case of TR,
we incorporate the reaction function directly in the aggregate demand equation and the agents’
problem boils down to forecasting inflation, output and debt. This, as we will show, should be
of help in anchoring expectations by aligning agents’ beliefs with the central bank’s monetary
policy strategy.
3 Results
This section presents the main results of the paper. We first consider the standard case of a
zero inflation target (i.e., zero inflation steady state), for which we recall, in the context of our
model, the analytical results available in literature. We then move to the more general and
realistic case of a positive inflation target for which some analytical conditions and numerical
simulations are provided.
We follow Leeper’s (1991) definition of active/passive monetary and fiscal policy: a policy
authority has an ‘active’ behaviour when it pursues its objective unconstrained by the actions
of the other authority; instead, if the authority is constrained, its behaviour is ‘passive’. Table
2 shows the possible policy mixes that can take place in our model for different values of the
parameters in the policy functions. Note that active fiscal policy corresponds to two different
areas depending on the value of γ, respectively γ < (1/β − 1) (AFdown region) and γ > (1/β + 1)
(AFup region). Previous studies concentrate only on the AFdown region, where the additional
tax revenue generated by a small increase in the level of debt is less than the increase in interest
rates payments. The other region is disregarded, as the values of γ appear non reasonable. For
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γ > (1/β + 1), in fact, a shock raising debt would make taxes increase even beyond the amount
required to pay off the debt (including interest rates). In what follows, as an intellectual curiosity,
we show results even for this second area.
Table 2. Monetary/fiscal policy mixes for different values of φpi and γ
0 < φpi < 1 φpi > 1
γ > 1/β + 1 PM/AFup AM/AFup
1/β − 1 < γ < 1/β + 1 PM/PF AM/PF
γ < 1/β − 1 PM/AFdown AM/AFdown
3.1 Determinacy under zero-inflation target
Consider eqs (2)-(4). After assuming zero trend inflation (p¯i = 1), one obtains ηp¯i = ξp¯i = 0, thus
both the auxiliary variable and the measure of relative price dispersion become irrelevant for
inflation dynamics and the three equations collapse into
pˆit = βE
∗
t−1pˆit+1 + κE
∗
t−1yˆt, (8)
where κ = λ (1 + σn). Therefore, the model reduces to a three-equation dynamic system in the
variables yˆt, pˆit, and bˆt. The Blanchard-Kahn conditions for determinacy of the REE depend,
beside the Taylor principle, on the fiscal policy implemented by the government. The determi-
nacy properties of our model trace the original findings obtained by Leeper (1991) in his flexible
price model: in case of passive fiscal policy, there is determinacy if monetary policy is active.
Conversely, in case of active fiscal policy determinacy holds if monetary policy is passive (proofs
can be found in the online appendix). Whereas the equilibrium is indeterminate under PM/PF
and explosive under AM/AF.
3.2 Determinacy under positive trend inflation
We now study how a positive trend inflation modifies the determinacy regions. In order to
compare our results with the existing literature, we discuss the flexible price and sticky price
cases separately.
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3.2.1 Flexible prices
Following the pivotal article by Leeper (1991) that adopts a representative agent, flexible price,
endowment economy, we check what happens to determinacy when trend inflation rises in ab-
sence of price rigidity (α = 0). Figure 1 illustrates the determinacy regions for different values
of the parameters of the monetary (φpi) and fiscal (γ) policy rules.
6 The white area indicates
determinacy, the dark grey area instability, the light grey area explosiveness. It is important to
note that the areas are identical to the zero inflation case and do not change as the inflation
target increases. We can therefore conclude that:
Result 1. Under flexible prices trend inflation does not affect determinacy.
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Fig. 1. Determinacy for every level of trend inflation under flexible prices
Notes: Indeterminacy: dark grey area; instability: light grey area; determinacy: white area.
Price flexibility completely offsets the effects of trend inflation. Price-setting firms have
always the possibility to change their prices to compensate the erosion of relative prices and
profits that trend inflation automatically creates.
3.2.2 Sticky prices
We now return to our sticky price model with trend inflation. In order to get analytical conditions
for determinacy, throughout this section we set σn = 0 (i.e. indivisible labour) and ε = 0 (no
price indexation). Proofs can be found in the online appendix.
6In the numerical simulation of the paper, unless otherwise stated, we use the rather standard parameter
values reported in Table 1.
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Proposition 1. Determinacy of the REE under positive trend inflation and passive fiscal policy
obtains if and only if
φpi > max(1, z(p¯i)).
z(p¯i) above is the largest root of a second degree inequality for φpi (eq. 17 in the online
appendix). We adopt a numerical approach to compute the two roots of such equation for
different values of p¯i: we find both roots to be real and of opposite sign, so we label the largest
root z(p¯i). Therefore the binding condition for determinacy is φpi > max(1, z(p¯i)).
The function z(p¯i) is shown in Fig. 2 and is computed by fixing all parameters other than
p¯i to their benchmark calibrated values. Importantly, our simulations show that ∂z(p¯i)/∂p¯i > 0
and that z(p¯i) > 1 when annualized trend inflation increases above 2.3%.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Annualized trend inflation
z
Fig. 2. Function z (p¯i) for every level of trend inflation
Proposition 2. Under active fiscal policy, determinacy is obtained if and only if
φpi < 1.
To investigate the relevance of these analytical results we revert to numerical simulations.
Figure 3 illustrates the determinacy region in the plane (φpi, γ) for different levels of annualized
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trend inflation under a contemporaneous rule with α = 0.75 and σn = 1.
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Fig. 3. Determinacy under positive trend inflation and sticky prices
Notes: Indeterminacy: dark grey area; instability: light grey area; determinacy: white area.
Result 2. Trend inflation does not affect determinacy in the PM case (i.e. in the φpi < 1 region).
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In particular, when a PM/AF regime is in place, there are two determinate areas: one
characterized by low taxes, the other by high taxes. An increase in inflation expectations spurs
output and inflation by stimulating a decline in real interest rates. However, the increase in
inflation changes the value of real debt and, thanks to wealth effect, drives inflation and thus
the economy back to the steady state. Trend inflation does not change these determinacy
conditions. Even the PM/PF area remains indeterminate as trend inflation increases.
Result 3. Trend inflation affects determinacy for AM cases.
As can be gauged from Fig. 3, z(p¯i) corresponds to a vertical line to the right of φpi = 1 for
7For the sake of brevity, we go straight to the more interesting case σn = 1; however, the case σn = 0 gives
comparable results and it is available from the authors.
8Rossi (2009) obtains the same result employing a model with distortionary taxation and taxes levied on
wages.
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inflation targets greater than 2%. In particular, with trend inflation higher than that value, in
order to have the AM/PF zone determinate, the central bank has to react more to inflation (i.e.
increase φpi).
Under zero trend inflation, in the AM/PF case, the equilibrium is determinate. As trend
inflation rises, active monetary policy (φpi > 1) does not guarantee determinacy per se; we
instead need monetary policy to be hawkish (φpi  1). Since the output weight in the Phillips
curve declines when trend inflation increases, in order to get the desired effect on inflation, the
real rate has to increase by a greater extent. The explosive AM/AF area shrinks, as trend
inflation increases, together with the determinacy area in the AM/PF case.
From a central bank’s perspective, as for determinacy is concerned, the level of inflation that
returns the larger area for determinacy in the active monetary case would be around 0-2%.
3.3 Learning under trend inflation
3.3.1 The case of known inflation target
The figures below report the values of the coefficients of monetary and fiscal policy that return
E-stability (white area) under opacity (Fig. 4) and transparency (Fig. 5) for different values of
trend inflation when the PLM does not include a constant term, which is akin to assume that
agents know the inflation target set by the central bank.
The case with zero trend inflation and monetary policy transparency returns results sim-
ilar to those derived by Evans and Honkapohja (2007) employing the flexible price model by
Leeper (1991): in particular, if one disregards, as Evans and Honkapohja do, the top left area
(PM/AFup), determinacy implies E-stability. At a first glance, E-stability results are not tightly
linked to the determinacy ones. Different trend inflation can have the same determinacy zones
but different E-stability ones (compare the cases with trend inflation equal to 0 and 2%).
3.3.1.1 Non-Ricardian regimes
Result 4. The area with PM/AFup is always determinate but never E-stable (neither under TR
nor under OP); the area PM/AFdown is always determinate and always E-stable under both TR
and OP.
In both regions, an increase in inflation expectations causes a reduction in real interest rates.
These, increasing output, stimulate inflation that, in turn, reduces the value of real debt. Since
13
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Fig. 4. Learning under monetary policy opacity
Notes: White area: E-stability; grey area: E-instability.
we are in a non-Ricardian equilibrium, wealth effects are in place but these differ within the two
regions. This is due to the fact that the effects of real debt on inflation vary according to the
size of the fiscal coefficient γ in the fiscal rule.9 In the PM/AFdown region there is a negative
wealth effect that, by decreasing output and inflation, drives the economy back to the steady
state stabilizing expectations. Conversely, in the PM/AFup region, when taxes react strongly to
debt, the lower real debt spurs inflation further reducing real rates thus causing an increase in
effective output and inflation, consistently higher than expected, and in turn destabilizing the
economy.
Result 4 holds for every level of trend inflation. Hence in a non-Ricardian context, deter-
minacy and E-stability conditions are insensitive to changes in trend inflation: E-stability just
requires taxes to react weakly to government debt.
9It can be shown that in the PM/AFdown region this effect is positive but it weakens as γ increases; in the
PM/AFup one the same effect becomes negative.
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Fig. 5. Learning under monetary policy transparency
Notes: White area: E-stability; grey area: E-instability.
3.3.1.2 Ricardian regimes The AM/PF regime, if determinate, is always E-stable under
TR, not under OP. Furthermore:
Result 5. Responding aggressively to inflation helps to anchor expectations under TR but not
under OP.
After a positive shock to inflation expectations, a transparent central bank, by increasing
accordingly the real rate, restraints aggregate demand thus lowering inflation expectations. In
this case, thanks to TR, expected real rates equal effective ones and inflation expectations are
stabilized.
According to our model, a gap between expected and effective real rates would translate into
a gap between expected and effective inflation hence in unanchored inflation expectations. This
is what happens under OP when agents fail to anticipate the initial increase of the real rate,
even if the central bank follows the Taylor principle. As a result, output rises leading to an
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increase in inflation that validates the surge in inflation expectations. Since policy responds not
to current, but to expected variables, a strong response to expected inflation tends to destabilize
the economy. When, in the following periods, agents realise that real rates were higher than
expected they revise their real rate expectations upwards. This adjustment is larger the more
the central bank previously reacted to inflation. The more the central bank responds to the
inflation rate, the more the gap between expected and effective real rates rises, the more agents
expectations are destabilized. The closer φpi to 1, the smaller this effect.
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3.3.1.3 Uncoordinated regimes If a regime is indeterminate (see the PM/PF case) it is
never E-stable; if it is explosive (see AM/AF) can instead be E-stable. In case of TR with
AM/AF the explosive solution can be learnable. Therefore the monetary and fiscal authority
need not to coordinate their policies if they want to implement a learnable equilibrium. In
particular, in case of OP, the regime AM/AFup is E-stable just for low values of φpi but E-
stability shrinks and gradually disappears as trend inflation rises. The same regime is E-stable
under TR but, again, E-stability shrinks as trend inflation rises. AM/AFdown is never E-stable
neither with TR, nor with OP.
3.3.2 The case of unknown inflation target
If we want agents to learn the target as well, we have to consider a model that includes a constant
term in the PLM. In this case E-stability additionaly requires that the constant converges to
its true value under rational expectations, i.e. zero. The E-stability results when agents know
neither the inflation target nor the interest rate rule are presented in Fig. 6, which is unchanged
for all the different levels of trend inflation considered in the paper.
Even under this case we have that the area with PM/AFup is always determinate but never
E-stable and the area with PM/AFdown is always determinate and E-stable irrespective of the
level of trend inflation. However, when agents know the interest rate rule but ignore the inflation
target we get, for zero trend inflation, the corresponding picture in Fig. 511 while, for every
higher trend inflation, we get, again, Fig. 6 above.
10For a more detailed explanation of what is going on and for the effects of trend inflation on E-stability under
OP see Section 2.3 in the online appendix.
11Note that our analysis is consistent here, under zero trend inflation, with results by Bullard and Mitra
(2002) under lagged expectations: for the Ricardian case we have that the determinate region coincides with the
expectationally stable region.
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Fig. 6. Learning for unknown inflation target and policy rule, all levels of trend inflation
Notes: White area: E-stability; grey area: E-instability.
Result 6. If there is a positive inflation target and the central bank does not disclose it, there is
E-stability just in non-Ricardian regimes with taxes reacting weakly to government debt.
E-stability in the Ricardian case obtains only when the central bank targets a zero inflation
rate. Our results for the Ricardian regime differ from Kobayashi and Muto (2013) and Kurozumi
(2014) who find E-stability under positive trend inflation when agents ignore the inflation target.
Their study, however, is based on contemporaneous expectations (E∗t ) while we maintain the
assumption that expectations are formed in t − 1.12 As shown in Eusepi and Preston (2010),
lagged expectations are a key driver of expectation destabilization when the central bank is not
fully transparent.
When agents do not learn the level of trend inflation their misperceptions on trend inflation
rate seriously affect macroeconomic stability. As a result, communicating just the inflation
target is an important driver for (partially) stabilizing expectations in the Ricardian regime
(compare Figs 4 and 6). However, communicating the target in addition to the interest rate rule
is crucial to highly improve E-stability (see Fig. 5).
3.4 Impulse response functions
Figures 7 and 8 report impulse response of output, inflation and real debt to, respectively,
monetary and fiscal shocks employing the usual calibration (see Table 1) on our model. Each
12In fact, when we assume contemporaneous expectations we find E-stability even under positive trend inflation.
See the robustness checks in Section 3.5.
17
figure is divided in three columns: one for the AM/PF case, one for the PM/AFup, the last
for PM/AFdown.
13 Furthermore, every single impulse response is depicted for different values of
trend inflation. Again, our aim is to check if higher values of trend inflation change the responses
to shocks when different policy mixes are in place.
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Fig. 7. Impulse response to a contractionary, one standard deviation monetary policy shock
Notes: a) AM/PF (φpi = 3, γ = 0.2); b) PM/AF
up (φpi = 0.5, γ = 3); c) PM/AFdown (φpi = 0.5, γ = 0). Trend
inflation: solid line=0%, dashed=2%, dash-dotted=4%, dotted=6%.
Figure 7 shows the responses to a monetary policy tightening. In the AM/PF regime with
low levels of trend inflation, both inflation and output decrease on impact, but the contractionary
effect on both these variables weakens as trend inflation increases. Moreover, for high levels of
trend inflation, not only output reacts less but it even increases on impact causing an ‘output
puzzle’: this is related to the sign change in the Phillips curve slope described by Ascari and
Ropele (2009). As already noted by Ascari and Ropele (2007), persistence of the impulse
response for both output and inflation increases with trend inflation. In the PM/AFdown case,
13We restrict attention to the two determinate regimes since the double passive and the double active regimes
imply, respectively, indeterminacy and no solution. These impulse response are computed under rational expec-
tations. We find them almost identical to the ones obtainable under learning for the E-stable regions. Results
are available from the authors upon request.
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with zero trend inflation, inflation and output rise. An interest rate increase raises the value of
government debt to cover the larger interest rate expenses. Agents, in this non-Ricardian setup,
perceive the higher debt as net wealth since they do not expect it to be backed up by future
taxes hence increase spending and this, in turn, pushes up the price level causing a ‘price puzzle’.
The higher trend inflation, the more the price puzzle grows while output (through lower real
interest rates) and real debt decrease. Conversely, in the PM/AFup zone, the (high) increase
in the tax rate causes a negative wealth effect that leads output and inflation to decrease on
impact. Lower inflation counteracts the effect of higher taxes making real debt increase. The
higher trend inflation, the more output (through lower real interest rates) and inflation decrease
bringing about a real debt increase.
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Fig. 8. Impulse response to a contractionary, one standard deviation fiscal policy shock
Notes: a) AM/PF (φpi = 3, γ = 0.2); b) PM/AF
up (φpi = 0.5, γ = 3); c) PM/AFdown (φpi = 0.5, γ = 0). Trend
inflation: solid line=0%, dashed=2%, dash-dotted=4%, dotted=6%.
A fiscal shock (Fig. 8) does not affect output and inflation under a AM/PF regime since
the monetarist solution holds hence their dynamics do not depend on the dynamics of fiscal
variables. Higher taxes in the PM/AFdown regime cause a negative wealth effect that makes
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output and inflation decrease. The reduction in prices makes real debt increase. On the other
hand, in the PM/AFup regime the initial decrease in debt carried by the shock makes taxes
fall by a great extent leading to an increase in output and inflation that, in turn, makes real
debt fall. Higher trend inflation tempers the effects on output while, in the PM/AFdown case,
it exacerbates the debt increase.
3.5 Robustness
In this section we investigate the robustness of our results along different dimensions.14
3.5.1 Policy Rule
First, we investigate if and how results change when a different policy rule is considered. A
forward looking interest rate rule under flexible prices confirms, even under trend inflation, the
results by Branch et al. (2008), according to whom determinacy holds provided fiscal policy
is active. With a backward looking interest rate rule, instead, determinacy obtains provided
the policy mix is PM/AF and this is true for every level of trend inflation. Then Result 1 still
holds. Therefore, as in Branch et al., ‘for both forward- and backward-looking rules, determinacy
implies that the unique rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is non-Ricardian.’ Turning to
the sticky price model, employing a forward looking rule, irrespective of fiscal policy behaviour,
the REE is never determinate under AM as long as trend inflation is positive while Result 2
still holds. As for E-stability, while under zero trend inflation a forward looking rule returns
about the same results as the benchmark contemporaneous case, for positive trend inflation,
under both TR and OP, the only E-stable regime is the PM/AFdown one. While determinacy
results under price rigidity with a backward looking policy rule are similar to the benchmark
case, results concerning learning differ. Under both OP and TR the E-stability regions collapse
to the benchmark case under transparency.
3.5.2 Learning assumptions
In the paper we maintain the assumption that agents form expectation in t − 1 and that the
central bank reacts to these expectations. As in Eusepi and Preston (2010), this assumption
is crucial to study the implications of central bank communications. Indeed, once we assume
14Details on the results, including figures, if not otherwise stated, are omitted for brevity but are available
from the authors upon requests.
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contemporaneous expectations (E∗t ), any difference between transparency and opacity vanishes,
since in this case there is no central bank’s information fruitfully exploitable by the public,
neither about the inflation target nor about interest rates. Furthermore, while the determinacy
regions do not change, the E-stability results, both under known and unknown inflation targets,
are equal to the TR case under the E∗t−1 specification except for the non-Ricardian region that
becomes always learnable.15
3.5.3 Model structure
First, we check how results change for different degrees of price rigidity (see figures A2-A7 in
the online appendix). We find the degree of price stickiness to be a crucial structural parameter
both for determinacy and E-stability. While under flexible prices trend inflation does not affect
determinacy, the more rigidity increases (higher α) the more, as trend inflation rises, results differ
from the zero inflation case. Furthermore, for α = 0.91 the AM/PF mix is never determinate
for trend inflation larger than 2%. However, with less rigid prices (α = 0.35), we get for
determinacy the same results as with flexible prices.16 What is more, transparency is needed to
stabilize expectations in countries with flexible prices since it always sharply improves E-stability
with respect to opacity. On the contrary, with high rigidity, TR does not improve relative to
OP.
Second, we examine the effects of a higher debt/GDP ratio (in the benchmark case fixed
at b¯ = 0.4). We find that higher levels of b¯ do not affect determinacy and only slightly change
E-stability results under OP and TR.
Third, decreasing the value of the elasticity of substitution (θ) weakens the effects of trend
inflation on determinacy and on E-stability results. Increasing the intertemporal elasticity of
labour supply (σn) reduces the E-stability area under both OP and TR and this effect worsens
with trend inflation.
Finally, we examine the effects of including price indexation. It is well-known that indexation
counteracts the effects of trend inflation. We find that this is true both for determinacy and
E-stability.
15E-stability figures under contemporaneous expectations are available from the authors upon request.
16The calibration values for high (α = 0.91) and low (α = 0.35) degree of price rigidity are taken, respectively,
from the estimates by Smets and Wouters (2003) for the euro area and by Olivei and Tenreyro (2007) for the
United States.
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4 Conclusions
This paper proves that a higher inflation target unanchors expectations under active monetary
regimes but not under passive monetary ones. When a central bank, for example, follows a
Taylor rule in the Ricardian regime, the higher the inflation target, the smaller the determinacy
and the E-stability regions. Moreover, the higher the inflation target, the more the policy should
be hawkish with respect to inflation in order to stabilize expectations when the central bank
discloses both target inflation and policy response. This is not true in a non-Ricardian context,
where determinacy and E-stability are unaffected by changes in trend inflation. Transparency of
both the inflation target and the reaction function helps anchoring expectations - returning an
E-stability region wider under transparency than under opacity - for all inflation targets under
active monetary policy. The AM/PF regime, if determinate, is always E-stable under TR when
the inflation target is known; the PM/AFdown is always determinate and E-stable. A double
active policy with taxes reacting highly to debt can be learnable under transparency. Therefore,
with the help of transparency, the monetary and the fiscal authority could coordinate to a lesser
extent their policies to get E-stability under learning.
Finally, the more flexible are prices, the more transparency is valuable. In a low price
rigidity country, say the United States, adhering to the Taylor principle is a sufficient condition
for equilibrium determinacy under the AM/PF regime, irrespective of the level of trend inflation.
Still, the central bank must be transparent to stabilize expectations. On the contrary, in a high
price rigidity economy, say the euro zone, to have determinacy under AM/PF mix, we find that
the inflation target cannot be larger than 2% but the central bank needs not to be transparent
to stabilize expectations. Furthermore, high rigidity makes non-Ricardian policies less E-stable.
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